The Evolution of Private Equity: Corporate Restructuring in the UK, c.1945-2010 by Toms, S et al.
	



	

	



	
	
 !∀#∃∃
	

	
				
 


!∀#∀
∀∃%	∀&∋()∗+,−
	

.	−/	01

	
		%	2∀∗3+4()∗)56	
0∀+∋+, 4 78##∃
)))4 ∗
		

%∗)∗)7)))) ∗()∗3( (
%


&

	9	

				

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2145445
0 
 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Private Equity: Corporate Restructuring in the UK, c.1945-2010 
 
 
By 
 
Steven Toms* 
Accounting and Finance Division 
Leeds University Business School 
 
Nick Wilson 
Credit Management Research Centre 
Leeds University Business School 
 
Mike Wright 
Centre for Management Buy-out Research 
Imperial College Business School 
And 
University of Ghent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 10,100 (excluding tables and notes) 
 
 
 
 
 
*Correspondence:  
J.S. Toms 
Professor of Accounting and Finance  
Leeds University Business School 
Room 2.09, Maurice Keyworth Building  
University of Leeds  
Leeds  
LS2 9JT 
Tel: 44(113)-3434456 
Email: J.S.Toms@leeds.ac.uk 
http://business.leeds.ac.uk/about-us/faculty-staff/member/profile/steve-toms/ 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2145445
1 
 
  
 
The Evolution of Private Equity: Corporate Restructuring in the UK, c.1945-2010.  
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the role of private equity in restructuring the UK corporate economy. It 
develops a theoretical synthesis to show that the evolution of the PE industry and firms in 
which it invested were governed by the relations of corporate governance between investor 
and investee companies. Effective governance relations were a necessary condition for 
success and complement firm specific resources to create competitive advantage. Four case 
studies are used to show the contrasting effects of these determining factors, ICFC and Slater 
Walker, and the two waves of buy-out centred restructuring that developed with the 
maturity of the PE industry after 1980. In contrast to the evolutionary approach, the 
periodisations utilised in this study show that structural breaks associated with points of 
institutional reform are also necessary to make firm specific resource and governance 
determinants of competitive advantage operable. 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the radical impact of private equity (PE)1 in restructuring the British 
corporate economy in the period 1945-2010. A historical approach is particularly useful 
because several contrasting models of industry financing and governance have been used 
since the Second World War resulting in differing performance outcomes. It is therefore 
possible to use these contrasts to examine the critical success factors associated with the 
provision of financial services to industry. To examine these contrasts the paper covers 
three periods. The first up to around 1980 featured attempts to mobilise venture capital by 
government backed initiatives on the one hand and aggressive speculative buying and 
selling of companies on the other, both of which were relatively unsuccessful. Second, the 
post 1980 period saw the rapid emergence of the PE industry and associated management 
buy-outs, the first wave of deals lasting until the late 1980s. The third period is the 
subsequent second PE wave in the early 2000s, with different characteristics, reflecting the 
greater maturity of the industry, and which lasted up to the financial crisis of 2007-08. By 
examining the determinants of success and failure in these three periods, the paper aims to 
identify critical success factors in corporate governance likely to assist practitioners and 
policy makers. 
                                                          
1
 WƌŝǀĂƚĞĞƋƵŝƚǇŝƐƌŝƐŬĐĂƉŝƚĂů ? “ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ? )ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ŚĞŶĐĞ “ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ? ?ĂƐ
opposed to public) (Gilligan and Wright, Private Equity Demystified).  Private equity is about buying 
stakes in businesses, transforming businesses and then realising the value created by selling or 
floating the business.  These businesses range from early stage ventures, usually termed venture 
capital investments, through businesses requiring growth capital to the purchase of an established 
business in a management buyout or buyin. Although all these cases involve private equity, the term 
now generally refers to the buyouts and buyins of established businesses and these are the focus of 
this study. Private equity investments are illiquid and traded only on acquisition or exit (although this 
is changing). Generally, but not always, private equity managers have very good information prior to 
making their investment through their due diligence processes and during any investment through 
contractual rights and close involvement with the investee company.   
3 
 
Although the traditional business history style objective of using evidence from 
multiple sources to test period and context specific necessary conditions and cause and 
effect relationships is important, another aim is to show how the insights offered by 
evolutionary theory might be complemented. In evolutionary theory, the firm is normally 
taken as the unit of analysis, or variable whose evolution is to be theorised and whose 
behaviour is governed by capabilities, decision rules and routines. The variable set is 
governed by some inertial tendencies, but also subject to dynamic and systematic 
winnowing mechanisms and random variations.2 
Examining the role of PE provides an innovative opportunity to theorise a new 
evolving variable set: the relations between the PE firm and investee firm.3 These relations 
are essentially the governance and accountability structures that are enforced in return for 
the provision of financial resources.4 Systematic winnowing mechanisms arise from market 
and non-market institutions, principally the market for corporate control (MCC) 5 and the 
institutions of political regulation respectively. At the same time, governance and 
accountability relations are subject to random variations, for example arising from 
continuous asset revaluations determined by trading or speculative activities and the impact 
on risk and return of claims associated with those assets. They are also subject to forms of 
inertia, for example where economic relations become embedded in social ties or through 
                                                          
2
 EĞůƐŽŶ ? ‘ZĞĐĞŶƚǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇdŚĞŽƌŝǌŝŶŐ ? ?pp.54, 68. Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory, 
p.4. 
3
 In the fashion of Nelson and Winter (An evolutionary theory, p.47), this variable is used for the 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƵƐŝŶŐĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
4
 Such an approach complements studies that have examined the dynamics of large shifts in 
governance structure, such as the impact of deregulation Kole, and Lehn,  ‘ĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
5
 The MCC refers to the existence of conditions, for example liquid share markets, transparent and 
flexible managerial labour markets, appropriate institutions of financial inter-mediation, promoting 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƚƐ  ?,ŝƚƚ ? Ğƚ Ăů ?  ‘dŚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĨŽƌ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ) ?
4 
 
contractual lock-in effects, managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking behaviour.6 Because 
the relations of governance and accountability are the key variables, rent seeking is defined 
here as a function of human activity and the creation of knowledge assets, that might arise 
for example from R&D routines. Insofar as value arises from these routines through 
innovation, the rents can be captured purely by the individuals creating them where 
governance mechanisms are ineffective. Where governance is more effective, the profits of 
innovation are captured in the form of profits as an index of observable competitive 
advantage for the capital market. 
Utilising a set of governance relation variables, the paper contributes in several 
ways. First, it enhances the strategic management literature by advancing a theoretically 
consistent explanation of how governance relationships might enhance competitive 
advantage. Second, by examining the creation of value through the possession of 
knowledge used in business relationships,7 it provides a vehicle for improving our 
understanding of the symbiotic development of business organisations and the MCC. Rather 
than studying the MCC as an economic institution, this approach concentrates instead on 
examining the acquisition and application of knowledge by market participants. Financial 
services firms, such as merchant banks, venture capital and PE firms are of equal importance 
vis-a-vis firms producing goods and services, which are often the principal or sole focus of 
analysis in both the business history and strategic management literatures. Third, it adds to 
the business history literature by examining the strategic role of intermediate organisations 
and how they have contributed to the evolution of capitalist institutions, business 
organisations and their performance. In doing so it updates our knowledge of the 
                                                          
6
 On embedded relations, see Granovetter,  ‘ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
7
 And builds on previous knowledge based approaches, e.g., Grant, `Toward a knowledge-based 
theory'.  
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development of the market for corporate control since 1980, up to and including the recent 
financial crisis.  
 To achieve these objectives the paper introduces a conceptual framework relating 
knowledge assets, financial resources and governance relationships to competitive 
advantage, set out in the next section. To assess the implied relationships, the paper then 
presents an empirical case study of the UK PE market 1950-2010 in three parts. The first 
deals with two contrasting case studies, the government backed Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation (ICFC) and its successor organisation, Investors in Industry (3i) and the 
creation and downfall of the Slater Walker empire based on the speculative buying and 
selling of companies. The second examines the features of the first wave of PE. The third 
deals with the second PE wave. A final section draws conclusions. 
 
Literature review and conceptual framework 
In 1950 the governance and accountability relation between capital markets and industry 
was characterised by block shareholdings of family and managerial groups as a consequence 
of earlier phases of economic development.8 The MCC promoted amalgamations of firms 
into industrial federations, encouraging director interlocks and limiting the influence of 
outside and institutional investors. Hostile takeovers became more prevalent in the 1960s 
as firms used the stock market to raise new capital and a more active market in company 
shares developed.9 The development of diversified, decentralised managerially controlled 
firms proceeded in the period up to 1980, but was truncated by the subsequent institutional 
changes, characteriseĚ ĂƐ  ‘ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
                                                          
8
 Chandler, Scale and Scope 
9
 Hannah, The rise of the corporate economy; ,ŝŐŐŝŶƐĂŶĚdŽŵƐ ? ‘&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
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globalisation, and emphasis on higher and short term returns on financial investments as 
performance measures.10 
The emergence of the PE industry and associated restructuring provides a strong 
contrast to the characteristics of family, insider and managerial capitalism adopted in some 
UK economic sectors in the period 1950-1980.11 Its development has been associated with 
the evolution of deeper financial markets, more transparent corporate governance and a 
breaking down of monopoly rents in relational banking and in industrial sectors hitherto 
controlled by large firms.12  ^ŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚ ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ ůĂƌŐĞ
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ďǇ Ă  ‘ĚŝǀĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ ĚŽǁŶƐŝǌĞ ? logic which has resulted in 
increased dividend payments and share repurchases and reductions in the workforces of 
large US and UK corporations, driven by financial market deregulation and the emergence of 
the MCC.13 Contrasting these trends, prior business history literature has documented the 
development of the buy-out market, the emergence of PE funded buy-outs in the UK as a 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ĂŶĚan explanation of the 
historic differences between the role of PE in the US and UK contexts.14 The emergence of 
PE and other capital market intermediaries has been characterised as comparable to the 
managerial revolution in terms of its effect on business organisation and the distribution of 
                                                          
10>ĂŶŐůĞǇ ? ‘/ŶƚŚĞĞǇĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƐƚŽƌŵ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?^ƚŽĐŬŚĂŵŵĞƌ ? ‘&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ ?
tĂŝŶĞ ? ‘^ŽĐŝĂůŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
11
 Toms and Wright 'Corporate governaŶĐĞ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?dŽŵƐĂŶĚtŝůƐŽŶ ? ‘^ĐĂůĞ ?ƐĐŽƉĞ
ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 
12
 ZĂũĂŶĂŶĚŝŶŐĂůĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƌĞǀĞƌƐĂůƐ ? 
13>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬĂŶĚK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ? ‘DĂǆŝŵŝƐŝŶŐƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞ ? ? 
14
 Respectively, tƌŝŐŚƚ ? ŚŝƉůŝŶ ? ZŽďďŝĞ ?  ? ůďƌŝŐŚƚŽŶ ?  ‘dŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ of an organisational 
ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŽŵƐ ĂŶĚ tƌŝŐŚƚ  ?ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? dŽŵƐ ĂŶĚ tƌŝŐŚƚ  ‘
ŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
7 
 
surplus away from traditional stakeholders, including shareholders, in favour of a new 
elite.15 
Observing these developments, as early as 1989, Jensen argued that the public 
corporation was being eclipsed by the emergence of PE and that this was a positive 
development. Business performance he argued was inhibited by embedded agency costs in 
the traditional diversified publicly quoted conglomerate. PE backed firms by contrast were 
able to embed capital market mentalities into managerial behaviour and incentives, whilst 
using high levels of debt to restrict access to free cash flow.16 In contrast, Lazonick and 
K ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽƐŝŽŶŝŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƚŽĐŬ
option based incentive packages for senior executives successfully created alignment of 
managerial behaviour in favour of shareholder value maximisation.17 However, the use of 
these incentives has often led to opportunistic behaviour by managers at the expense of 
shareholders and internal stakeholders.18 Private ownership and executive incentives may 
therefore be substitutes and act as necessary but not sufficient conditions for competitive 
advantage and the creation of shareholder value.  
To build on this literature, we propose that the governance skills offered by PE 
investors can create competitive advantage, particularly through the application of specialist 
knowledge of capital market functions. Resource based view (RBV) theorists have argued 
that value arises from acquiring or merging with firms that possess different but 
complementary resource mixes, thereby creating synergistic complementarities.19 Such 
                                                          
15&ŽůŬŵĂŶ ?ĞƚĂů ‘tŽƌŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĐ ?Ĩ ?tŽŽĚĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚ ‘tĂǇǁĂƌĚĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
16
 :ĞŶƐĞŶ ? ‘dŚĞĞĐůŝƉƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
17>ĂǌŽŶŝĐŬĂŶĚK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘DĂǆŝŵŝƐŝŶŐƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞ ? 
18
 ŽǇĞƌ ? ‘,ŽǁƚŽŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚZĞǁĂƌĚDĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ? 
19,ŝƚƚ ?,ŽƐŬŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĚ<ŝŵ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
8 
 
resources might include both production and governance skills20, which in turn are 
complementary within and between firms.21 For PE firms, these might consist of financial 
and governance engineering.22 DĂĚŚŽŬĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐŬŝůůƐ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐŬŝůůƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵĐŚ ƐŬŝůůƐ ĂƌĞ
 ‘ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ? ďǇ  ‘ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ? ?23 However where competitive advantage and value is created 
through complementary resource mixes, it follows that governance skills must arise from 
the sharing of knowledge between corporate managers and the owners of capital, and 
cannot be fully internalised or appropriated by the firm, but must also be possessed to some 
extent bǇƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?/ƚŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽĞǆƚĞŶĚDĂĚŚŽŬ ?ƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌZsƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?
approaches in this fashion because it removes the problem of reification suggested by the 
ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĨŝƌŵƐ ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƐŬŝůůƐ ? 
If a dynamic capability is defined as the fiƌŵ ?Ɛ  ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ? ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?
ŐĂŝŶ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ƚŽ ŵĂƚĐŚ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?24 then effective 
governance processes are necessarily implicated in what is required to create competitive 
advantage on this basis.  The role of PE, as outlined by Jensen, also matches these processes 
in that all can be linked to strategic value creation. For Jensen, this is effective because 
capital market mentalities are ingrained into managerial decision making. However this only 
follows insofar as capital market rationalities can be translated into clear decision making 
criteria for managers.25 Where idiosyncratic knowledge is embedded in firm or asset specific 
processes, there are problems translating process specific probabilities and lead times into 
                                                          
20
 Barney, Ketchen ĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚ ? ‘dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? 
21
 DĂĚŚŽŬ ? ‘ZĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐ ? ? 
22
 <ĂƉůĂŶĂŶĚ^ƚƌŽŵďĞƌŐ ? ‘>ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĚďƵǇŽƵƚƐ ? ? 
23
 DĂĚŚŽŬ ? ‘ZĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐ ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-546.  
24ŝƐĞŶŚĂƌĚƚĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶ ‘ǇŶĂŵŝĐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?
25
 Where production is performed by teams and individual contributions are unknown, the 
ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞŵĞƚĞƌĞĚďǇŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ůĐŚŝĂŶĂŶĚĞŵƐĞƚǌ ‘WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƐƚƐ ? ? 
9 
 
parameters for capital market valuation models. For these reasons, PE firms rely on signals 
that go beyond the content of business plans, relying on sound ideas and social contacts, 
such that social capital ties are a necessary condition for the creation of dynamic 
capability.26 
Intermediaries occupying a network position between otherwise unconnected 
actors, accrue rents by brokering information or resources, so that network centrality might 
put an intermediary in a better position to accrue rents.
27
 For example, PE investors act as 
gatekeepers for their portfolio companies, facilitating information flows through their 
network.
28
 Analogously, in a capital market informed individuals accrue abnormal returns 
through differential access to information.
29
 
Although the end result is similar, firms and capital markets create rents in different 
ways. The firm, and firm level actors, create rents through the development of innovative 
resource combinations. In capital markets, rents arise from mispricing and adjustments 
towards equilibrium. Where new information reaches the market in the form of a generic 
shock, for example a sudden change in the oil price, it is more effective at processing 
information than individuals, and adjusting corporate valuations accordingly. Conversely, 
where new information reaches the market from within the firm, for example an investment 
in a process likely to lead to an R&D breakthrough, firm insiders will be better placed than 
the market to evaluate its likely effect. In the knowledge-based view, these directions of 
information arrival impact who appropriates surplus and the character of the surplus. Firm 
level knowledge where linked to discovery is value creating non-zero sum rent. Firm insiders 
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are in a good position to appropriate the gains from discovery where there is causal 
ambiguity of contribution or the knowledge is idiosyncratic.
30
 Market engendered 
knowledge on the other hand arises from circulation of capital and in its purest form is a 
transaction cost driven zero sum game.  
However, capital can never engage in pure circulation; at some point capital that has 
arisen from the productive sphere must re-enter it in the form of reinvestment.  It is at 
these points of entry and exit that governance skills can be important and value adding.31 
Value creation arises from knowledge sharing; for example PE firms create competitive 
advantage through rigorous due diligence procedures.32 Because firms have different levels 
of absorptive capacity, defined as the ability to identify, accumulate, process and use the 
new knowledge gained from external sources,33 they will assimilate knowledge at different 
rates. Even in a fairly efficient market, abnormal returns accrue to relatively informed 
investors at the expense of the uninformed.34 It follows that specialist capital market 
participants can create capital market based competitive advantage where knowledge 
processes are linked to technical market operations, for example derivative trading. Indeed 
evidence suggests that PE investors are better monitors with better incentives than public 
shareholders, especially in firms with significant derivative trading activity and derivative 
contract positions.35 PE investors, as financial specialists, are often involved in further fund 
raising and M&A-operations.36 
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The joint determinants of competitive advantage that follow from this linkage, firm 
resources and governance skills, are set out in figure 1. These physical, knowledge and 
financial resources are used to categorise specific aspects of the relations between the 
investee firm and the portfolio firm investor, set out in the second and third columns. These 
are the critical success factors that if positive will be linked to strategic outcomes for the 
partner on each side of the relation. Following the above review, the framework 
hypothesises that rent accrual to insiders will be reduced by due diligence and related 
monitoring processes. PE firms will use their network to access external economies of scale 
and scope, e.g. cheaper and multiple sources of finance, and can add value through 
governance skills, e.g. due diligence, new forms of financing, technical knowledge of capital 
market operations, incentive alignment etc. In the cases below, empirical evidence is 
analysed according to the sub-sections in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Success and failure in corporate finance and restructuring pre 1980 
For long periods, the British economy developed without the benefit of institutions focused 
on providing structured finance to industry, particularly small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). As a consequence, historians have characterised the banking system as having 
 ‘ĨĂŝůĞĚ ? ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?37  ůŽŶŐ ƌƵŶ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ
development of the London money market to support government and international 
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 Committee on Finance and Industry (Macmillan Committee): Report of Committee (Cmd. 3897), 
1931 ? ‘ ?d ?ŚĞƐĂŵĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞƋƵŝƚǇŐĂƉ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĂŶŐĞǁĂƐĨƌŽŵ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽŽŶĞŵŝůůŝŽŶƉŽƵŶĚƐ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ? ‘&ŽƌĞǁŽƌĚ ? ?Ɖ ? ?; Capie, and Collins, Have the Banks Failed 
British Industry? 
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ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůŽǁĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌǇďĂŶŬƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐation.38 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Gladstonian balanced budget finance created a 
demand for private sector bond finance and structured debt in the form of preference 
shares and debentures.39 By the early twentieth century, banks had evolved into an 
oligopolistic risk-averse cartel, reluctant to lend start up capital to smaller businesses.40 As a 
consequence, British firms were used to relying on banks for working capital finance, and 
regional stock markets for long term sources of funding. Established firms relied on their 
own resources, reinforcing family and insider control, whilst new risky ventures attracted 
funds from syndicates of wealthy investors.41 In 1931, policy makers identified the lack of 
finance for industrial growth, in the range of £5000- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘DĂĐDŝůůĂŶŐĂƉ ? ?ĂŶĚ
this came to dominate the policy agenda for the next 70 years. 
 Against this background, the period 1945-1980 is worthy of more detailed analysis, 
as it provides a series of contrasts, at institutional, policy and firm levels, to the conditions 
that typically prevailed after 1980 and which facilitated the emergence of a substantial PE 
industry. These contrasts allow the sufficient and necessary conditions for the development 
of financial support for innovation and enterprise to be identified.  
Two cases are chosen, ICFC and Slater Walker. For many years, ICFC was the only 
dedicated source of tailored PE finance for SMEs, which in contrast to the post 1980 PE 
industry was closely controlled by the banking institutions, including the Bank of England. Its 
achievements were modest until the mid 1970s, reflecting the conflicting objectives of its 
shareholders and providing a useful illustration of governance constraints on resource use. 
The activities of Slater Walker on the other hand typified the wave of conglomerate based 
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 Michie, Guilty Money. 
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 DŝĐŚŝĞ ? ‘KƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?^ǇŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ? ?pp.147-165. 
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reconstruction arising from the development of the MCC in the 1960s. Other firms, such as 
Lonrho, Hanson and GEC, were also leading cases, although their acquisitions could be 
related to their core industrial strategy or longer run investments.42 For Slater Walker, the 
object was buying companies for purely financial investment purposes, so that the firm 
better typified the wasteful and ultimately ineffective corporate restructuring of the pre 
1980 period. These organisations represent different aspects of venture capitalism, 
characterised by portfolio holdings of high risk businesses in need of expertise and finance.43 
 
ICFC/3i 
ICFC was set up by the government with enforced participation by the clearing banks in 
1945. Its objective was to provide medium and long term finance to SMEs, with the Finance 
Corporation for Industry (FCI) providing finance for larger enterprises.44 Owned and 
controlled by the clearing banks, ICFC replicated many of the traditions of British finance, 
notwithstanding its apparent venture capitalist role. There is little prior research evidence 
on the ICFC, and the histories that have been written credit it with limited success based on 
firm specific long run investments, including risky sectors that might have been ignored by 
the banks, and note that it was held back by the restrictive attitudes of its owners, the 
commercial banks. As a consequence, ICFC did not experience the same pressures for 
delivering short term returns as the standard venture capital model based on a closed end 
limited partnership.45 
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 For example Hanson claimed it was only interested in buying companies for long term investment 
and not for selling on. Economist, 29
th
 October 1977, 
43DĂƌƚŝŶ ? ‘dŚĞ'ƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚ'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŶĂƚŽŵǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?
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 Coopey and Clark, 3i; Economist, 2
nd
 November, 1974, p.91. 
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Merlin Jones, The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, p.7. 
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ICFC slowly built up its resource base and investment selection skills in the period 
1945-1975. In the style of the traditional bank, it exercised careful scrutiny and 
conscientiously investigated funding applications.46 It attracted criticism for its cautious 
lending policy, being overly selective and preferring larger firms in adverse economic 
conditions.47 ICFC also provided expertise in new stock issues for firms wishing to float on 
the market, including provision of expertise in the allotment process.48 There was also an 
emphasis on working capital finance and a reluctance to take up equity stakes.49 In 1952, 
only 8% of funds were invested in equity, with 38% in secured loans and 22% in unsecured 
loans, reflected in a general reduction in bad debt provisions.50 As selection criteria were 
tightened further in the credit squeeze of the 1950s, only 15% of cases supported were 
entirely new ventures.51 ICFC did not always successfully screen potential investors and was 
ĨŽƵŶĚǁĂŶƚŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐĨůŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZĂůƉŚ,ŝůƚŽŶdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ďĞŝŶŐƵŶĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ,ŝůƚŽŶ ?Ɛ
lack of integrity and accounting manipulations.52 
From the outset, ICFC was able to provide bespoke financial services giving firms 
access to lines of credit. Its lending policy was created to directly address the Macmillan 
gap, providing loans in the £5000 to £200,000 range.53 As ICFC progressively introduced 
more specialist subsidiary operations, its client organisations could access additional 
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 In doing so, it attracted criticism for assisting established businesses rather than addressing the 
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March, 1948, p. 519. 
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  ‘The ICFC In A ,ĞƐŝƚĂŶƚĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ? Economist,  20th May, 1950. 
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ǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? Economist,  17th  May 17, 1952; p. 470. 
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Economist, 7
th
 July, 1956; p. 89. 
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  ‘/&ĂŶĚĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶƚƐůĂŵĞĚŝŶ,ŝůƚŽŶZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?Michael Lafferty, Financial Times, 17th September, 
1976; p. 34. 
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Merlin Jones, The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, p.5. 
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bespoke financial services. These included the Estates Duties Investment Trust Company Ltd 
 ? ‘ĚŝƚŚ ? )ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚTechnical Development Capital (TDC) in 1966, which were established 
for very different purposes and only enjoyed moderate success.54 ICFC engaged throughout 
the build up of the Ship Mortgage Finance Company, up to and including its public flotation 
by a £4m debenture issue, but the amounts involved were insufficient to develop the ability 
to win contracts.55 The ICFC Venture Capital Fund was used inter alia to rescue strategic 
companies in difficulty.56 As the MCC developed in the 1960s, ICFC became a more 
aggressive, merchant bank type organisation, and set up its Industrial Mergers Ltd 
subsidiary charging commission where it had previously offered informal advice. It thereby 
became involved in 33 successful mergers in its first year.57 
Notwithstanding these apparent successes, a major limitation arose from /& ?Ɛ
network relationship with financial institutions. The shareholding clearing banks deliberately 
ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ  ‘ŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ /& ?58 potentially undermining its ability to perform due 
diligence.  They treated ICFC as a rival, which took business from them in times of tight 
credit.59 hŶƚŝů ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ /& ?Ɛ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ Ĩrequently squeezed when its 
shareholding banks restricted capital or increased its cost.60 This was overcome to some 
extent by an ICFC debenture issue in 1959. The £10m issue was a measure of lending 
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 Edith assisted family firms to market their shares and retain control in the face of capital 
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  ‘DŽŶĞǇ ĨŽƌ ^ŚŝƉƐ ? ?Economist,  ? ?ƚŚ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ‘,ŽůĞ ŵŝĚƐŚŝƉƐ ? ?Economist,  7th 
October, 1961, p. 72. 
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success, albeit at rates commensurate with commercial lending during the credit squeeze.61 
Even so, in the 1960s ICFC lending reached another plateau, with commercial banks better 
able to lend due to tax allowances on borrowed funds.62 Ultimate oversight by the Bank of 
England also meant that ICFC reflected the poůŝĐǇ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? /ƚ ŵĂĚĞ ůŽĂŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂŶƵƉƐƵƌŐĞŝŶůĞŶĚŝŶŐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨŝƌƐƚǇĞĂƌ
tax investment allowances, and specifically backed export orientated ventures.63 Even after 
it became involved in the buyout market, ICFC maintained a low profile. As Robert Smith, 
ŽŶĞƚŝŵĞŚĞĂĚŽĨďƵǇŽƵƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ P ‘/&ƚŚŽƵŐŚĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŚĂƐ
to maintain a fairly low profile for pretty obvious reasons. Active promotion of financial 
services for MBOs risks the charge of enticing management to break away from their 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?64 
/& ?Ɛ ? ůĂƚĞƌ  ?ŝ ?Ɛ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽĐ ŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ
 ‘ŚĂŶĚƐ-ŽĨĨ ? ?65 ICFC protected its investment by maintaining client contact, insisting on the 
plough-ďĂĐŬ ŽĨ ƉƌŽĨŝƚƐ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ďǇ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ ĚĂǇ ƚŽ ĚĂǇ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ
Fluidrive, a company specialising in clutches and gears, which was fostered through a 150k 
debenture.66 Formal managerial incentive packages were not used, and managerial free cash 
flow limited through the use of participating dividends. Portfolio management executives 
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Jones, The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, p.7. 
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monitored portfolio companies through comparing monthly accounts with the budget. They 
typically would not take a board seat, notwithstanding contractual rights, leaving this to 
non-executive directors appointed from their networks. Portfolio management executives 
(investment controllers) were typically involved in monitoring considerably more investees 
than would be the case for PE firms in later periods. Informal contact with investees 
amounted to 11 hours per year, about a tenth of that for hands-on investors. This human 
capital resource constraint meant that the allocation of attention to individual firms was 
quite limited.  Further, portfolio companies were typically minority investments, so avoiding 
subsidiaries reporting requirements.67 Unlike closed end fund PE firms, ICFC was not time-
constrained in the investee holding period. Rather, minority holdings made it difficult to 
force a realisation. Returns were therefore obtained through redeemable preference 
shares, and cumulative and participating dividends. Once redeemable preference shares 
were redeemed, ICFC were left with a small equity stake that effectively cost them very 
little. Participating dividends enabled ICFC to capture surplus cash once profits exceeded a 
predetermined level, also had a monitoring role. They pressured management to consider 
exiting or financial restructuring to avoid substantial cash flows which might otherwise be 
used for investment from being paid out to investors.68  This whole approach stored up 
major challenges when 3i became a listed corporation and subsequently needed to 
restructure and exit much of its vast portfolio of investee companies many of which had 
been held for decades. 
The performance outcomes were mixed, but generally improved through time as 
governance and policy constraints were relaxed. A commentator in the Economist 
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 ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ĞƚĂů ‘DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƵǇŽƵƚƐ ? 
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 Wright and Coyne, Management Buyouts.  
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summarised the strategy as  ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ Ă ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞůy useful function in a moderately 
ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ǁĂǇ ? ?69 There were other modest signs of success. ICFC backed firms had higher 
growth rates and percentage net profit before interest than average for quoted companies 
(13.5% compared to 12.3% in the three years to 1968).70 Some profits came from access to 
privileged information, for example, ICFC and Hambros Commercial Finance Corporation 
investment in the share issue of Shipton Automation.71 There were also some headline cases 
of even the most promising innovative projects not being financed by ICFC.72 
In short, prior to 1973, ICFC achieved limited results, held back by conflicts of 
interest with the banks and lacking resources required to offer significant financial services 
to industry. A watershed was reached in 1973, when ICFC and FCI were merged to create 
Finance for Industry (FFI).73 Ɛ ƚŚĞ &&/ ?Ɛ ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇ ?ĂŶĚŶĞǁĂŶŬŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐ
bank backed funding in response to the financial crisis of 1973, the ICFC became one of the 
largest lending institutions in Europe.74 Demand for ICFC loans rose steeply in the wake of 
the financial crisis, which created interest rate volatility, so that ICFC loans were attractive 
to entrepreneurs.75 The merger effectively doubled the lending capacity of ICFC.76  
In summary, ICFC was slowed by constraints on resources as a result of its own 
governance arrangements and position within the wider financial institutional network and 
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linkages to the policy agenda. These constraints were progressively removed, particularly 
after 1973, when its expanded resource base was used more explicitly for venture capital, 
restructuring and buy-out finance, thereby laying the foundations for the expansion of these 
facilities in the 1980s. 
 
Slater Walker 
Slater Walker (SW) was established in 1963 by the entrepreneur, Jim Slater. The history of 
SW is well documented,
77
 although it has attracted little attention in the literature. Slater 
tĂůŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ǁĂƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ĨƵŶĚƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ďǇ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
institutions (banks, pension funds, insurance funds) which adopted an "eyes-on, hands-off" 
approach to their investments, monitoring them, but having little or involvement in their 
management.
78
 
Firm specific resources were not consistently well used by SW or its portfolio 
companies. For example ^ůĂƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ŶĞǁ ůĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ Ăƚ WƌŽĚƵĐtofoam 
following its takeover was a failure due to technical problems.79 On the other hand, another 
^tĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?'ƌĞĞŶŐĂƚĞĂŶĚ/ƌǁĞůůZƵďďĞƌŽŵƉĂŶǇǁŽŶĂYƵĞŶ ?ƐǁĂƌĚĨŽƌŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ
in mining technology in 1968.80 At Greengate, Slater retained Marshall, the previous CEO to 
run the companies until a buyer could be found.81 SW backed Greengate with investment in 
a new factory at Trafford Park for the Cable division in 1969, and rationalised a string of 
acquired rubber companies into Allied Polymer, which it sold at a profit in a public offer in 
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1971.82 Frequently, incumbent managers were cast aside and their knowledge of the 
business ignored.83 Following the Crittall Hope takeover in 1968, John Crittall, Michael Hope 
and other incumbent managers were excluded from the specialist investigation teams of 
commissioned by Slater and staffed by external advisers.84 Crittall Hope was a family run 
firm of 5000 employees founded in 1818, earning consistent profits from an international 
portfolio of metal window frame manufacturing businesses. It was the product of a recent 
defensive merger between Crittall and Hope designed to protect market share from 
predatory pricing following the break-up of the Standard Metal Window price agreement by 
the Restrictive Practices Court in 1962, and was under pressure from the mid 60s slump in 
the UK building industry.85 ^ůĂƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ Ĩŝƌŵ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
informed by interest in growing the assets.  
According to one reviewer in the Economist, Slater possessed strong skills, based on 
scrutiny of balance sheets, for the effective selection of investee firms.
86
 Slater looked for 
target companies that were badly managed or with a mix of good and bad operating 
divisions where poor performing units could be sold.
87
 In many leading cases however, SW 
ƉĂŝĚ ƐĐĂŶƚ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚƵĞ ĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ^t ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ ŽĨ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĚĞĂůƐ
with financial journalists, determining real estate values for potentially surplus factories and 
offices, and technical calculations establishing the minimum value of compensation for 
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redundant employees.
88
  ‘ ?DĂǆ ?<ŝŶŐƚĞůůƐƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ^tƐĞůůŝŶŐƐŽŵĞǁĂƚƚůĞĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶĂƐƚ
Africa to Lonrho in a deal negotiated in just 90 minutes. As an afterthought, Tiny Rowland 
asked: "By the way, what is watƚůĞ ? ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ:ŝŵ^ůĂƚĞƌƌĞƉůŝĞĚ P ?tŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƚĨƌŝĐĂ ? ? ?89 
ZĂǁĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞ<ĞŝƚŚůĂĐŬŵĂŶƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌ P ‘ƵƚǁŚĞŶ^ůĂƚĞƌŐŽƚĂĐůŽƐĞƌůŽŽŬĂƚůĂĐŬŵĂŶ ?
he decided the job of reorganisation was not for him and within three months the company 
had been resold ĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ŵĐĂƐŚ ? ?90 Although the purchase and subsequent asset sale of Cork 
DĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐďǇ^t ?ƐƚŚĞŶŵĂŝŶǀĞŚŝĐůĞĨŽƌƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƐ ?WƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨŽĂŵ ?ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
capital profits, these were significantly reduced by subsequent undisclosed liabilities.
91
 Prior 
ƚŽƚŚĞƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌŽĨƌŝƚƚĂůů,ŽƉĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?^tŚĂĚŶŽŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐǁŝƚŚƌŝƚƚĂůů,ŽƉĞ ?Ɛ
German subsidiary. The discovery of these losses inflated the takeover premium further, 
and underpinned the decision of the Crittall Hope board to accept the offer.
92
 Over-
optimistic profit forecasts, first from the old board £1.4m (exit P/E = 24) and then from 
Slater (£2.5m).
93
 A subsequent analysis showed the corresponding actual profit for 1969 to 
be £635,000.
94
 &ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨ ^t ?Ɛ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ŐƌŽƵƉ ? Wƌoductofoam and George 
Wilson, also proved over-optimistic.
95
 Productoform reported a profit in line with forecast in 
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1966, but from share-dealing, not from the core laminating business.
96
 At the time of the 
Crittall deal (May 1968), Slater put out a profit forecast of £2.1m for SW itself, giving a 
prospective PE of 33. The high value of SW shares meant that the Keith Blackman takeover 
and subsequent disposal for cash created a surplus on the transaction.
97
 
DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ^t ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĂƐƐĞƚ ĚŝƐƉŽƐĂůs, rapidly built up reserves of 
cash and credibility with City institutions.
98
 The company was therefore in a good position to 
offer access to capital and lines of credit to its portfolio companies and invest capital where 
needed. In 1969, SW acquired Ralli Brothers, an established and licensed bank, which 
subsequently became the groups banking division.
99
 Notwithstanding these facilities, 
financial restructuring in subsidiaries was undertaken to benefit SW, rather than the 
investee company. For example GreenŐĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ƉƌĞ ƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌ ĐĂƐŚ ďĂůĂŶĐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ
replaced with an overdraft and a substantial inter-company debt.
100
 
Governance and accountability mechanisms were imposed in terms of financial 
targets rather than strategic involvement. SW businesses were run on the basis of 
maximising cash flow, for example by reviewing supplier credit terms, cutting employee 
benefits and raising customer prices.101 Profits from deals accrued to SW nominees, rather 
than as incentives for managers to achieve performance targets. At Crittall Hope, Slater 
installed himself as Chairman. He dismissed the non-executives, replacing them with his 
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nominees and although the two family directors, Crittall and Hope, kept their board 
positions their roles became nominal.102 
^t ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁĂƐƚŽbuy poorly performing firms that were in need of capital and 
reorganisation. There is no evidence however that the firms acquired were successfully 
turned around or that the resources were successfully repackaged to create competitive 
advantage for the investee firms. Productofoam and George Wilson both lost money after 
acquisition, and Crittall Hope suffered significant declines in profit, return on sales, return 
on capital and sales per employee, notwithstanding significant redundancies. Indeed almost 
all ŽĨ^t ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚĐĂŵĞĨƌŽŵďĂŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?103 SW offered 16s per share 
for Crittall Hope, valuing it at £18m on an earnings multiple of 100, acquiring the firm on 
18
th
 June, 1968.104 The premium over the market price was 25%. However the subsequent 
sale to Butterley (a public company already owned by SW) in 1971 only realised £9.25m.105 
 There were nonetheless successful rationalisations, for example Greengate and 
Allied Polymers, which resulted in significant exit profits for Slater Walker. Generally though, 
increases in portfolio value were mythical, and arose from subsidiary and asset sales within 
the group at unrealistic valuations. In 1976, SW collapsed, requiring a multi million pound 
bail out by the Bank of England.106 A particular reason for the collapse was bad debts in the 
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nd
 December 1975, estimated the required facility to protect depositors 
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th
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Banking division, which had a small number of large loans to SW portfolio companies and 
had also loaned extensively to finance mortgages for SW employees and associates.107 
 
Emergence and development of Private Equity, post 1980 
 
Private equity: the first wave of development 
The late 1970s witnessed the emergence of the modern PE industry, as a consequence of 
legislative and institutional changes that had a dramatic effect on the structure and 
performance of firms in the UK economy. New investment in ICFC provided the initial 
impetus. It expanded its resource base and consequently the scope of its activities, including 
marketing, head office staff and cash management and analysis functions.108 
An important aspect of the reformed and refinanced ICFC, previously undocumented 
in the literature, was its support for management buy-outs.109 Although small in relation to 
the subsequent development of the buyout market discussed below, it was a turnaround in 
strategy post the 1973 FFI merger for ICFC. It commenced this strategy in 1976, reporting in 
1978 that it had in the past two years loaned £3.4m secured on the equity of 23 
management buy-outs.110 Other banking institutions also began to enter the buy-out market 
in this period.111 Smith quotes the following deal number figures: 10 years to 1977 = 43, 
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1977/78 = 10, 1979/80 = 49, 1980/81 = 69.112 Following the merger, only about a quarter of 
capital was provided as participating equity, with the rest as structured loan finance on high 
gearing multiples.113 ICFC in particular was able to offer expertise to overcome legal 
obstacles to such transactions prior to the change in the law in 1981.114 Section 54 of the 
Companies Act 1948 prevented companies using their assets as security to buy their own 
shares. The rule was modified in Companies Act 1981,115 by which time ICFC had already 
ďƵŝůƚƵƉĂƚƌĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌĚĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉƌŽůŝĨŝĐƐƵƉŽƌƚĞƌŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďƵǇ-outs. In the 
period 1977-1981, ICFC organised 150 deals, giving de facto control to incumbent managers 
on debt equity ratios ranging between 5 and 10 to 1. Despite apparent high risk, losses to 
buy-outs were lower than for conventional lending activities.116 Restrictions on free cash 
flow arising from high structured debt levels, attention to cash management and planning, 
representing a change on the pre 1973 policy, and provision of specialist legal advice were 
the important aspects contributing to the success of this early buy-out wave. 
The beginning of the 1980s was a decisive turning point. Legislative changes, the 
development of more liquid capital markets and the willingness of firms to divest previously 
over-diversified holdings, provided strong impetus for what might be termed the first wave 
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of PE deals, which lasted until the late 1980s.117 The UK deal value of private equity and buy 
outs reached £1bn for the first time in 1986.118 
The synergistic properties set out in figure 1, that were almost completely absent in 
the SW empire, and only partially present in ICFC/3i, were now more fully realised. 
Incumbent subsidiary managers initiated many deals, taking advantage of their specialist 
and tacit knowledge, particularly in hi-tech sectors, to develop more radical entrepreneurial 
strategies than the previous ownership and control structure allowed.119 When applying due 
diligence, managerial experience and marketing ability were the principal criteria used by PE 
firms and venture capital funds.120 Internal rate of return became the most important 
measure, as prospective capital gain was the most important component of the pay-off 
from the investment.121 Post deal they used systems of active monitoring, for example 
through board seats, requirements for regular provision of management accounts, 
bolstered by the provision and surveillance of debt covenants by loan providers.122 Strong 
performance of PE firms was driven by capital restructuring, changes to managerial 
incentives, and relatively short time to exit, often through an initial public offering.123  
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Table 1 about here 
 
In view of the increasing frequency of transactions after 1980, it is appropriate to examine 
their systematic impact on economic performance, using large sample approaches, and in 
contrast to the case studies of leading firms in the earlier years.124 Evidence from the first 
wave of UK buyouts in the mid-1980s shows significant improvements in profitability, 
productivity and liquidity compared to matched non-buyouts. Table 1 compares the 
performance of buy-outs originating between 1982 and 1984 with a matched sample of 
non-buyout firms using a portfolio of financial and efficiency indicators over a period of six 
years after the buy-out transaction.  In particular, out-performance of buyouts is notable 
from the second year post buyout to the fifth year in terms of profitability and productivity. 
By year 6, significant out-performance seems to disappear; this may be either because the 
benefits of efficiency gains through cost reductions are exhausted or because the higher 
performing firms have exited the buy-out structure and been acquired and so no longer 
figure in the sample. 
 
Private equity: the second wave of development 
In the second wave, which developed from the late 1990s up to the crisis of 2008, the scale 
and scope of PE increased dramatically. Deal value reached £10bn by 1996 and £26bn by 
2006. Notwithstanding the relative lull in the early 1990s, by 1992 buy-outs accounted for 
57% of all takeover transactions.125 PE funds have diversified internationally to take 
advantage of the lower competition for deals outside the UK and US markets. Service and 
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infrastructure firms became notable targets for buy-outs in the period 2000-2004.126 At the 
same time they have become increasingly attractive to institutional investors, mobilising 
significant capital from global financial institutions.127 As a consequence, there was a trend 
away from divisional level buy-outs, in a context of completion of many corporate 
divestment programmes, to more public to private (PTP) whole company buy-outs including 
more strategic level management buy-ins and investor-led public to private and secondary 
buy-out transactions.128 Correspondingly, exits from PE deals in this period saw a marked 
shift away from IPOs to secondary buyouts.129 The year 2007 witnessed the peak of buy-out 
activity in terms of deal value, with most of the hitherto largest scale bids occurring in that 
year and deal value totalling £42.2bn.130 Value of bids reflect cyclical trends in the stock 
market, with a slump in deal values post 2007.  
As a consequence of increased scale and scope of their activities, existing PE firms 
expanded their resource bases to accommodate more expertise and greater specialised 
knowledge.  Specialised and complex resource bases have also become more important for 
investee firms as the UK has continued to shift towards a more knowledge based economy. 
There is much evidence, that experienced PE investors have become more adept at 
identifying target companies that are underperforming but nonetheless are cash generative 
with potential for profitability/productivity improvement via restructuring, refinancing and 
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the changing of governance arrangements.131 Experienced PE investors also became more 
involved in intensive post deal involvement to set the new strategic direction for the firm in 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ  ? ? ? ĚĂǇƐ ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ďƵǇŽƵƚ ?132 In contrast, this period also saw entry by 
inexperienced PE firms, attracted by previous high returns in the sector, with deals being 
completed with little if any due diligence.133  
As with the first wave, and notwithstanding the expanded scale and scope of activity, 
the evidence suggests that the complementary effects of resource bases in investee firms 
and PE firms and governance skills also played an important part in sustaining the more 
recent second wave. A number of recent studies of the relative performance of PE backed 
buyouts over the second wave (1995-2011)  have analysed the pre-buyout characteristics of 
PE investor target companies; the relative accounting performance of  PE backed 
companies, looking at accounting ratios, against control samples of buyouts and non-
buyouts; the relative productivity and profitability performance of company types in the 
context of multivariate econometric models; and the propensity to fail via insolvency of PE 
backed buyouts versus other buyout types and non-buyouts.134  
To develop these analyses further and to examine the resource and governance 
complementarities implied in figure 1, Table 2 summarises results from multivariate 
regression models determining profitability and productivity for a novel dataset compiled by 
the authors comprising the population of PE backed buyouts for which data were available 
and control samples in the period 1995-2011.135 Columns 1 and 3 summarise the 
determinants of profitability (return on assets, ROA) is specified as a function of industry 
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risk, age, competition, company types. To capture governance effects, the models are 
inclusive of director/board characteristics. The regressions isolate the effects of PE relative 
to other company types in column 1 and buyout types in column 3. The models are reported 
inclusive of time dummies and are estimated for the whole period.136 The coefficients on the 
PE dummy variables are significant and positive in all specifications, implying a positive 
profitability differential for PE over other company types of between 2 and 3%. Co-location 
is weakly significant and positive in the period prior to recession. Board size and director 
experience are positively associated with profitability whereas the average age of directors 
and multiple directorships have negative signs, suggesting that in line with figure 1, 
concentrations of experienced, younger directors are performance enhancing features of PE 
investment.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 Columns 2 and 4 summarise the results from production function estimates for the 
two samples, all companies and buyout only.  To examine differences in productive 
efficiency, production function models are specified. In these models total output (value 
added) is related to labour and capital inputs, together with controls for sector and 
competition to isolate productivity differentials for PE-backed companies versus other 
company types. 137 Capital and labour inputs were strongly significant, and their coefficients, 
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or elasticities, imply constant returns to scale. Meanwhile, the signs on the PE dummy 
variables are positive and significant in all specifications and time periods. The results 
therefore suggest a positive productivity differential of PE firms over other company types, 
which is actually stronger in the recession period. The differential is around 10% above the 
control sample and the interaction between PE and technology (high tech manufacturing) is 
positive. Results for the buyout sample show a superior performance of PE buyouts versus 
other management buy-ins. 
 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 summarise the factors determining variations in 
performance (profitability and productivity) amongst the sample of PE-backed companies.138  
The specification of the productivity and profit equations is the same, but to examine 
further the relationship between experience and performance implied in figure 1, for this 
subsample a range of variables reflecting the characteristics and experience of the PE 
investor are included. Variables are included to measure PE experience in terms of prior 
deals and orientation to specialist sectors.139 The PE experience variable is positive and 
significant in both models. Interactions between the PE experience variable and technology 
are positive and significant, implying support for the complementarities between resource 
and governance suggested in figure 1. 
The presence of a syndicate of PE firms leads to an improvement in performance, 
while foreign PE firms have a more significant impact on productivity. Controlling by type of 
PE buyout with a dummy variable for MBO shows that MBOs have superior performance.140 
Column 5 reports the estimates of the profitability equation. Again the PE experience 
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variables are significant and positive but the foreign ownership attracts a negative but 
insignificant sign and the syndicate variable is positive but weakly significant. The 
productivity equations (Column 6) are well specified and the control variables are in line 
with previous estimates. For the variables of interest we find positive significant coefficients 
on all variables suggesting that PE experience, syndication and foreign ownership have 
positive impacts on productivity within the PE sub-sample. MBOs exhibit higher productivity 
compared to other forms of buyout. 
The evidence suggests that the relationship between resources, governance and 
performance has persisted during the recent recession. Unlike in the US junk bond crisis of 
the 80s, UK PE firms seem to have avoided similar problems in the second wave, 
notwithstanding their adoption of whole company buy-outs and increased use of CDOs and 
CLOs and so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĐŽǀ-ůŝƚĞ ?ůŽĂŶƐ141, before 2008. Indeed in the period 2004-2007, PE firms 
were able to access debt relatively cheaply vis-a-vis LIBOR.142 Profit and productivity 
differentials were higher in the recession period, particularly in relation to public companies 
and strongly significant (Appendix A, A1 and A2).This suggests that PE-backed buyouts can 
better maintain their profitability in recessionary periods than non-buyouts. Co-located 
directors may have a greater closeness to the business which may be more appropriate for 
activities to improve profitability in more buoyant economic conditions but these may be 
riskier such that profitability is adversely affected in recessionary conditions. The 
significance of interactions between resources and experience were also weaker after the 
onset of recession, possibility for the same reason. 
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To examine the effect of the recession more closely, further evidence on the long 
term relative performance of PE backed buyouts vis-a-vis other buyout types and other non-
buyout company types is provided in Table 3, based on multivariate models reported in 
Appendix A. Table 3 shows financial ratios reflecting profitability, leverage and debt 
coverage; working capital and growth in turnover, employment, value-added and profit.143 
We compare the mean and median values144 of these ratios for sub-samples of company 
types covering the whole sample period; a period pre recession (2002-6) and the recession 
period 2007-2011. T-tests are conducted to identify significant differences in the means of 
the PE and other sub-samples (public and control samples). 
  
Table 3 about here 
 
The mean ROA, profit margin and interest coverage ratio for PE backed buyouts 
were higher in the recession period of 2007-2011 than in the pre-recession period (Table 3).  
The mean difference in profitability ratios was greater for PE-backed buyouts than for the 
matched private companies or the public companies. With respect to growth rates, PE-
backed buyouts on average experienced greater growth in turnover, employment and value 
added in the recessionary period, but not in terms of profits. These increases were greater 
than for the matched private firms. This suggests that first because PE investors are skilled 
at targeting profitable companies (in lower risk sectors) with scope for efficiency and profit 
improvements they create companies that show scope for improving performance. Second, 
they are more robust in down turns, as their lower debt to total assets ratio during the 
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recession period also suggests. Other recent evidence supports the view that PE 
restructuring using debt has not increased financial distress or bankruptcy risk and that PE 
firms as well as targeting better buyout prospects are in a better position, because of active 
ownership and governance, to adjust capital structure over the economic cycle and, 
therefore, manage insolvency risk and protect assets.145 
PE backed firms had relatively greater liquidity. A greater proportion of invested 
capital was in liquid assets, particularly debtors and cash, financed by correspondingly 
higher levels of trade credit than in the matched non PE group (table 3 and appendix B). 
Lower dependency on fixed assets and sunk investments has reduced the vulnerability of 
these firms in the credit crunch, with PE backed firms maintaining high working capital 
ratios post recession (table 3), whilst creating greater flexibility and exit potential for the 
investor. Meanwhile, other survey evidence shows that PE backed firms achieve better 
working capital management and control.146  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The paper has analysed the development of the private equity industry in the UK since 1950 
using a range of empirical and statistical sources. There is considerable evidence to show 
that firm-specific resource characteristics, when complemented by governance skills from 
dedicated private equity investors, enhance firm performance. Within specific sub-periods, 
perhaps most notably since 1980, the governance relation appears to have characteristics 
consistent with evolutionary approaches, in that it acts as a systematic winnowing 
mechanism likely to impact on survival and success of particular firms or groups of firms. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
It has been shown that  a periodisation approach enables a longer run perspective 
that incorporates sharp discontinuities, as the contrast of the pre 1980 and post 1980 
periods illustrate. Figure 2 summarises the case studies analysed above using the criteria set 
out in figure 1. PE experiments prior to 1980 either failed disastrously, in the absence of 
both resource-based investment and governance skills as in the case of SW, or were only 
partially successful due to lŝŵŝƚĞĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞďĂƐĞĂŶĚĂ  ‘ŚĂŶĚƐŽĨĨ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ
from the investor, as in the case of ICFC/3i. These earlier failures were bound up with the 
pre 1980 institutional and regulatory climate, which by emphasising creditor protection and 
capital maintenance not only stifled capital restructuring, but also failed to prevent fraud at 
the expense of creditors and minorities, as the SW case again illustrates. In the second 
period, characterised by divestment and downsizing by corporations, private equity 
investments typically involved performance improvements being generated through cost 
cutting and efficiency improvements. Human capital governance resources of private equity 
executives primarily involved financial monitoring, while portfolio firm management teams 
possessed specific human capital resources relating to the business. In the third period, 
when much of the corporate restructuring of the 1980/1990s had been completed, there 
was a shift in emphasis towards both efficiency improvements and growth seeking, with 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ? ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ŵŽƌĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
value adding skills, especially for private equity firms with long experience.   
In contrast to the evolutionary approach then, our more traditional business history 
methodology emphasises contrasting periodisations and their discontinuities. Path 
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dependencies and populations of firms and their behaviour are perhaps therefore better 
analysed within sub-periods rather than over the longer run. Further, as recent research has 
begun to examine the factors associated with shifting path dependencies147, adopting a 
periodisation approach may enable these shifts to be identified. Even so, as our analysis 
illustrates, firm specific effects and governance skills might offer perennial routes to 
competitive advantage, for example continuing to prevail even after the 2007-08 financial 
crisis, provided the institutional framework is supportive.   
 
 
  
                                                          
147
 ŚƵũĂĂŶĚ<ĂƚŝůĂ ? ‘tŚĞƌĞĚŽƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵ ? ? 
37 
 
Sources 
Centre for Management Buy-Out Research (CMBOR) database, comprising statistics on 
30,000 deals, 1986-2012.  
Companies House: Website and Annual Reports 
Economist Historical Archive 
Financial Times 
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Figure 1: Resource and governance relational synergies and strategic outcomes 
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Portfolio investor level 
characteristic 
Resources   
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knowledge  
*Growth and productivity 
potential 
 
*Firm selection skills 
*Due diligence 
*Investment against  
potential in long term 
productivity and 
employment 
 
- External economies 
of scale and scope 
Bespoke financial packages 
and access to lines of credit 
Relationship with networks, 
financial institutions and 
credit markets 
Governance and 
Accountability  
*Incentive packages 
* Managerial equity 
ownership 
*Provision of full, timely 
information on current 
trading 
 
*Investee Board 
membership  
*Financial monitoring skills 
and active intervention 
* Covenants 
* Restrictions on access to 
FCF 
 
Strategic outcomes 
 
 *Cash flow and working 
capital control 
*Cost reduction 
* Facilitation of exit 
strategy/realisation 
* increase in portfolio value 
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Table 1: Post Buyout Performance compared to non-buyouts in the first wave.  
 
Variable T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 
1.RoA 0.005 0.044 0.051 0.051 0.033 0.039 
 0.015 0.052 0.087* 0.086* 0.064** 0.058 
2.RoE 0.76 0.008 -0.37 -1.02 0.069 0.165 
 0.30 0.982 -0.09 0.41* 0.305* 0.120 
3.Profit/employee 348 1016 997 2804 1229 1327 
 81 2704 3127** 4979 2204* 2150* 
4.Current Ratio 1.35 3.91 1.60 1.34 1.76 1.43 
 1.07 1.41 2.44 1.59* 1.35 1.56 
5.Networth/total 
assets 
0.338 0.39 0.39 0.345 0.298 0.299 
 0.076 0.27* 0.36 0.392 0.325 0.339 
6. MBO variable 
in Productivity 
Analysis 
0.05 0.07* 0.16** 0.11* 0.21*** 0.002 
 
Notes: T+1 to t+6 relate to years post buyout 
For rows 1-5, First figure in each row is mean for non-buyouts, second figure is mean 
for buyouts.  
For row 6, figures are size of MBO dummy variable in Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function estimates and indicate that in years t+2 to t+5 MBO productivity is 
significantly higher than for matched non-buyout 
*= 5%; ** 1% level; *** 0.01%  significance levels based on mean difference t-tests 
 
Sources: Based on 251 buyouts completed 1982-84 followed up to 1991 or failure; 
and 446 matched non-buyouts taken from Wright et al. (1996). 
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Table 2 Summary of Multivariate Models Determining Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable > ROA Productivity ROA Productivity ROA Productivity
Control Variables
Age and Size Capital Џ Џ Џ
Labour Џ Џ Џ
Company Age Џ А Џ А Џ Џ
Company Type Listed А Џ  Џ
Family А А  А
Subsidiary Џ Џ  Џ
Buyout Type MBO Џ Џ А Џ Џ Џ
MBI А А А А
Industry Characteristics Industry Risk - Failure Rate Џ А Џ А Џ Џ
Competition Concentration Џ А Џ А Џ Џ
High Technology Џ Џ Џ Џ Џ Џ
Board Characteristcs Age Profile (Ave Age) А А А А А А
Experience (sector, total) Џ Џ Џ Џ Џ Џ
Multiple Directorships А А А А А А
Colocation Џ А Џ А Џ Џ
PE Investors PE Backed Dummy +3% +10%
PE * High Tech (Manuf) +5% Џ
PE* High Tech (Serv) +2% Џ
PE Experience Џ Џ
Syndicated Џ Џ
Foreign Parent А Џ
PE Experience* High Tech (Manuf) Џ
PE Experience* High Tech (Serv) Џ Џ
Macro Characteristics Year yes yes yes yes
Source: Appendix A Table A2 Table A1 Table A6 Table A6 Table A4 Table A3
Corporate Population Buyout Population PE Backed Population
Control Samples
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Table 3:  Analysis of the Performance of PE Backed Companies Before and During the 
2007-08 Recession 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Profit & Debt Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ROA(%) 7.602 4.830 8.384 4.357 5.767 3.000 5.543 2.330
Gross Margin(%) 36.338 31.804 34.932 31.480 34.343 26.330 29.645 21.157
Debt/TA(%) 35.730 30.000 27.324 16.000 38.305 34.000 30.821 21.000
Coverage(%) 25.440 3.130 36.906 3.570 27.415 2.311 29.418 1.833
Ave Annual Change
Growth Turnover 0.115 0.044 0.092 0.042 0.186 0.048 0.133 0.028
Growth Employment 0.036 0.000 0.047 0.008 0.052 0.000 0.043 0.000
Growth Value Added 0.162 0.048 0.169 0.049 0.233 0.058 0.198 0.042
Growth Profit 0.358 0.077 0.307 0.058 0.423 0.069 0.310 0.026
Working Capital 
Cash/TA 0.089 0.028 0.102 0.037 0.078 0.014 0.087 0.015
Debtors/TA 0.237 0.232 0.233 0.194 0.115 0.026 0.107 0.159
Creditors/TL 0.286 0.229 0.288 0.221 0.142 0.043 0.143 0.035
Stock/TA 0.112 0.052 0.094 0.022 0.092 0.002 0.087 0.000
PE Backed Matched Private
Pre: Recession Recession Pre: Recession Recession 
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Figure 2: Resource and governance synergies and strategic outcomes over time 
 
 Slater Walker, 1964-76 ICFC/3i, 1945-1980 1
st
 PE buy-out wave, 1980-89 2
nd
 PE buy-out wave, 1996-2008 
 Investees Investor Investees Investor Investees Investor Investees Investor 
Resource 
characteristics 
*Incumbent 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?
knowledge ignored 
* High exit and 
alternative use 
values 
* Selection based 
on disposal/ break-
up value 
* No due diligence 
* Emphasis on 
short term 
* Effective use of 
incumbent 
knowledge 
*Growth and 
productivity 
potential 
* Cautiously 
selective, larger 
firms only 
* Structural and 
competitive 
limitations on due 
diligence 
* long run 
investment policy 
*Deals initiated by 
incumbent business unit 
managers  
*High growth and  tech 
firms benefitted 
significantly 
 
* Effective firm 
selection skills 
*Strict due diligence 
*Investment against  
potential in long term 
productivity and 
employment 
 
*Board level 
involvement in 
whole company 
buy-outs 
*Specialised 
complex resource 
bases with 
potential for 
financial  
restructuring 
* Further 
improvements in 
firm selection skills 
by experienced 
investors 
* limited due 
diligence by new 
investors 
* Investment 
against potential 
for productivity 
and growth 
External economies 
of scale and scope 
*Use of equity 
finance rather than 
structured loans 
*Strong credibility 
with City 
institutions 
*Bespoke financial 
packages through 
specialist subsidiary  
organisations 
*Limited access to 
financial markets 
before 1973 
*Bespoke financial 
packages and access to 
highly leveraged lines of 
credit with extensive 
covenants 
*Relationship with 
networks, financial 
institutions and credit 
markets 
*Bespoke financial 
packages and 
access to generally 
lower leveraged 
lines of credit with 
minimal covenants, 
collateralized debt 
obligations, etc. 
*Relationships 
extended to global 
credit networks 
and suppliers 
Governance skills Incentive packages 
not used, local 
management not 
trusted 
No emphasis on 
managerial 
ownership 
Strong 
accountability on 
financial targets 
 
*Investee board 
membership 
*Financial, not 
strategic control. 
Covenants not used 
All FCF remitted 
directly to investor 
*Incentive 
packages not used 
*No emphasis on 
managerial 
ownership 
*Support for 
planning and 
marketing 
*No board 
membership 
 ? ‘,ĂŶĚƐŽĨĨ ?
approach 
*Covenants not 
used 
*Use of 
participating 
dividends restricts 
access to FCF 
*Incentive packages 
* Managerial equity 
ownership 
*Provision of full, timely 
information using 
management accounts 
* Prevalence of 
executives directors 
from inside the firm 
 
 Implementation of 
governance 
mechanisms on deal 
*Investee Board 
membership  
*Financial monitoring 
skills and active 
strategic intervention 
* Covenants 
* Restrictions on 
access to FCF 
*Value added by 
concentrations of 
experienced but 
younger directors 
* Greater 
prevalence of 
executive directors 
from outside (MBIs) 
* Greater sector 
specific and 
specialist expertise 
* Intensive post 
deal involvement 
to set strategy in 
 ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ ? ? ?ĚĂǇƐ ? 
Performance 
outcomes 
*No efficiency 
improvements 
* Tight cash flow 
control 
* Cost reduction 
achieved 
 
*Strong emphasis 
on exit/closure 
*High value 
transfers to 
investor, collapse 
and failure 
 
Survival and growth 
without necessarily 
improving 
efficiency 
Cash flow control 
*No emphasis on 
exit  
*Extended and 
illogical portfolio  
* Increased 
profitability/efficiency 
* Cash flow and working 
capital control 
*Cost reduction 
* Facilitation of exit 
strategy/ realisation 
often through stock 
market flotation (IPO) 
* increase in portfolio 
value 
*Increased 
profitability/ 
productivity 
particularly in hi 
tech firms 
* Higher 
performance 
returns mainly by 
experienced 
investors 
* Exits increasingly 
through secondary 
buyouts, very little 
IPO 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Productivity: Controlling for Director Characteristics 
This table presents regression estimates of the determinants of productivity. Variable definitions are: Productivity (log value added); labor (log 
number of FT employees); capital (log assets deflated by GDP deflator); HHI competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry 
concentration calculated by summing the squared market shares of each firm in the sector); industry risk (indwoe is the industry weight of 
evidence) measures the log odds of insolvency in each sector, at t-1. ); High technology codes for service and manufacturing and interaction 
terms with PE company dummies; company age (log Age); dummy variables for company ownership type in terms of PE backed buyouts (PE), 
management buyouts (MBO), management buy-ins (MBI), family owned firms (family), publicly listed corporations (Public), a subsidiary of a 
larger group (subsidiary); and time dummies.  Variables reflecting the characteristics of directors. The analyses cover the whole period of the 
study (1995-2011), the pre-recession period (1995-2006); and the recession period (2007-2011). 
51 
 
 
 
Table A2: Multivariate Models Determining Return on Assets (ROA): Controlling for Director Characteristics 
 
This table provide multivariate analysis models concerning the determinants of return on assets (ROA). Variable definitions are: HHI 
competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration calculated by summing the squared market shares of each firm in the 
sector); industry risk (indwoe is the industry weight of evidence) measures the log odds of insolvency in each sector, at t-1. ); High technology 
codes for service and manufacturing and interaction terms with PE company dummies; company age (log Age); dummy variables for company 
ownership type in terms of PE backed buyouts (PE), management buyouts (MBO), management buy-ins (MBI), family owned firms (family), 
publicly listed corporations (Public), a subsidiary of a larger group (subsidiary); Variables reflecting the characteristics of directors and time 
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dummies.  The analyses cover the whole period of the study (1995-2009), the pre-recession period (1995-2006); and the recession period 
(2007-2009). 
 
 
 
Table A3: Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Productivity: PE Backed Buyouts Only Sample  
 
This table presents regression estimates of the determinants of productivity. Variable definitions are: Productivity (log value added); labour 
(log number of FT employees); capital (log assets deflated by GDP deflator); HHI competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry 
concentration calculated by summing the squared market shares of each firm in the sector); industry risk (indwoe is the industry weight of 
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evidence) measures the log odds of insolvency in each sector, at t-1. ); High technology codes for service and manufacturing ;company age (log 
Age); Director and PE experience variables; PE experience interaction with the technology dummies. The analyses cover the whole period of 
the study (1995-2011), the pre-recession period (1995-2006); and the recession period (2007-2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Multivariate Models Determining Return on Assets (ROA):PE Backed Buyouts Only Sample  
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This table provide multivariate analysis models concerning the determinants of return on assets (ROA). Variable definitions are: HHI 
competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration calculated by summing the squared market shares of each firm in the 
sector); industry risk (indwoe is the industry weight of evidence) measures the log odds of insolvency in each sector, at t-1. ); High technology 
codes for service and manufacturing ; company age (log Age); Variables reflecting the characteristics of directors and PE experience.PE 
experience interaction with the technology dummies.  The analyses cover the whole period of the study (1995-2011), the pre-recession period 
(1995-2006); and the recession period (2007-2011). 
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Appendix B  Relative Performance:   PE Backed and Matched Private Companies 
 
This table presents mean data for PE backed buyouts and matched private firms for each 
year in the period 1999-2010 using a number of ratios relating to profitability and debt; 
changes in performance variables, and working capital variables: return on assets (ROA), 
gross margin, debt to total assets ratio (Debt/TA); interest coverage ratio (Coverage); cash 
to total assets ratio (cash/TA), Debtors to total assets ratio (Debt/TA); Creditors to total 
liabilities ratio (Creditors/TL); and Stock to total assets ratio (Stock/TA).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matched
PE Backed  Private
Year 
ROA Gross Margin Debt/TA Coverage ROA Gross Margin Debt/TA Coverage
1999 7.13 30.66 37.06 20.88 5.69 29.61 37.89 30.50
2000 5.60 30.60 37.59 22.00 5.05 28.63 38.40 30.04
2001 5.32 31.41 36.91 21.45 4.82 30.02 38.88 29.96
2002 4.87 33.28 37.86 21.75 4.56 32.13 39.15 31.14
2003 5.66 35.03 37.89 25.09 4.93 33.05 39.16 32.29
2004 7.19 35.86 36.12 23.84 5.78 33.99 38.68 27.92
2005 8.64 37.16 34.64 25.97 5.87 34.81 38.07 25.76
2006 8.74 37.15 34.50 26.71 6.24 35.06 37.68 25.34
2007 10.13 37.40 34.28 30.50 6.54 34.75 37.46 25.93
2008 9.21 36.42 30.58 35.27 5.72 31.37 36.33 26.50
2009 6.72 33.72 24.70 36.29 4.50 28.16 26.89 29.36
2010 7.30 31.86 14.52 47.11 5.40 25.19 16.90 36.46
Matched
PE Backed  Private
Year 
Cash/TA Debtors/TA Creditors/TL Stock/TA Cash/TA Debtors/TA Creditors/TL Stock/TA
1999 7.65 25.04 27.52 13.27 6.627 13.30 15.60 10.01
2000 6.94 24.93 27.29 12.77 6.778 12.90 15.21 9.43
2001 7.53 24.84 27.10 12.88 6.980 12.36 14.62 9.31
2002 8.18 23.67 27.15 12.37 7.120 11.98 14.45 9.18
2003 8.20 23.35 27.99 12.06 7.346 11.84 14.52 9.21
2004 8.70 23.81 28.44 11.44 7.675 11.67 14.22 9.31
2005 9.14 23.86 29.27 11.24 8.005 11.34 14.00 9.19
2006 9.39 23.75 28.72 10.38 8.157 11.14 14.12 8.96
2007 10.01 22.82 29.25 10.11 8.437 10.96 14.21 8.85
2008 10.42 22.64 29.44 9.60 8.457 10.79 14.55 9.05
2009 10.17 21.36 27.53 8.82 8.784 10.25 13.77 8.55
2010 10.25 22.37 28.71 8.77 9.059 10.69 14.58 8.32
